Switzerland's Oscilloquartz is adding Galileo's Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) to several of its timing and synchronization platforms, according to Inside GNSS. The move targets a growing security gap: telecom, energy, financial and computing infrastructure depend on GNSS for precise timing, but spoofed or replayed satellite signals can feed receivers a false time reference and propagate errors into systems that depend on tight synchronization.
The OSNMA capability is being incorporated into Oscilloquartz's OSA5412, OSA5422 and OSA5430/40 platforms through integration of u-blox's ZED-F9T high-accuracy timing module. OSNMA, which became operational as a civil authentication service in July 2025, lets a receiver cryptographically verify that the Galileo navigation data it processes actually originated from the constellation rather than simply accepting a signal because it has the right characteristics.
Oscilloquartz is pairing OSNMA with its existing Syncjack technology, which is designed to flag record-and-replay attacks, known as meaconing. The two work on different parts of the problem: OSNMA authenticates the navigation message itself, while Syncjack looks for suspicious behavior associated with manipulated or replayed signals.
According to Inside GNSS, the integration can be delivered through firmware upgrades, meaning operators would not need to replace existing hardware or interrupt service to adopt it. Potential beneficiaries include cellular networks, which require tightly controlled timing for synchronization, as well as electrical grids, financial systems and data centers that rely on accurate timestamps and stable frequency references.